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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
THE BANK SECRECY ACT, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT,
AND STANDING
In 1970, out of growing concern over the use of secret
foreign bank accounts and foreign financial institutions to
defraud the government of taxes and to conceal other crimi-
nal conduct,' Congress passed the Bank Secrecy Act.2 The Act
and its accompanying regulations 3 were intended to aid the
government in the detection and prevention of "organized
and white collar crime ' 4 by requiring that federally insured
banks5 and both insured and uninsured financial institutions6
maintain records which have, or may have, "a high degree of
usefulness in criminal, tax and regulatory investigations and
proceedings. 17
Prior to the enactment of the Bank Secrecy Act, only
non-bank financial institutions had to report certain transac-
1. HEARINGS ON H.R. 15073 BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON BANK-
ING AND CURRENCY, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 18 (1970). For a discussion of
Swiss bank accounts, see Note, The "Secret" Swiss Account: End of an Era, 38
BROOKLYN L. REV. 384 (1971).
2. 12 U.S.C. § 1829(b) (1970) (retention of records by insured banks); 12
U.S.C. § 1730(d) (1970) (retention of records of savings and loan institutions
insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Ins. Corp.); 12 U.S.C. § 1951-59
(1970) (retention of records by noninsured financial institutions); and 31
U.S.C. § 1051-1143 (1970) (reporting of domestic and foreign currency transac-
tions). Enacted as Act of October 26, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114-24.
3. 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.21-.26 (1972); 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.31-.37 (1972).
4. H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970).
5. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(h) (1970) defines insured bank as "any bank the de-
posits of which are insured in accordance with the provisions of this chapter."
6. "Financial institution" is defined as "each agency, branch or office
within the United States of any person doing business in one or more of the
capacities listed below: (1) a bank (except bank credit card systems); (2) a
broker or dealer in securities; (3) a person who engages in dealing in or
exchanging currency, as for example, a dealer in foreign exchange or a
person engaged primarily in the cashing of checks; (4) a person who engages
as a business in the issuing, selling or redeeming of travelers' checks, money
orders, or similar instruments, except one who does so as a selling agent
exclusively or as an incidental part of another business; (5) a licensed trans-
mitter of funds, or other person engaged in the business of transmitting
funds abroad for others." 31 C.F.R. § 103.11 (1973).
7. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(1) (1970). The House Committee on Banking and
Currency concluded that the secrecy laws of foreign countries furnish oppor-
tunities for American citizens to abuse United States law by violating securi-
ties law, by avoiding the payment of taxes, by perpetrating fraud on creditors
in bankruptcy proceedings, by depositing proceeds of organized crime in
foreign banks, and by attempting corporate takeovers. HEARINGS ON H.R.
15073, supra note 1, at 20-27.
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tions, and then only when the amounts involved, in the judg-
ment of the financial institution, exceeded those "commensu-
rate with the customary conduct of the business, industry or
profession of the person or organization concerned. ' 8 Before
passage of the Act many banks had abolished or limited the
practice of photocopying checks, drafts and similar instru-
ments drawn on them for payment.9 Their failure to maintain
extensive records frustrated law enforcement personnel in
securing evidence necessary to criminal, tax and regulatory
investigations and proceedings. 10  As a result, Congress
enacted the Bank Secrecy Act" to provide a source of evi-
dence for the Justice Department to use in obtaining convic-
tions. 12
The Act is comprised of two titles. Title I, the Financial
Recordkeeping section, allows the Secretary of the Treasury
to require that each insured bank 13 or financial institution 4
make duplicate records, by microfilm or other method of re-
production, of each check, draft, or similar instrument pre-
sented to it for payment or received by it for deposit, 15 with
certain exceptions.' 6 Banks are required to retain these rec-
ords for two years;' 7 financial institutions must retain them
for five years.18 Under Title II of the Act, the Currency and
Foreign Transactions Reporting section, the Secretary may
require that each bank and other financial institution report
8. 31 C.F.R. § 102.1 (1959), repealed, 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1972).
9. H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1970).
10. Id.
11. The Bank Secrecy Act was enacted on October 26, 1970, to become
effective on May 1, 1971, but the implementing Treasury Regulations did not
become operative until July 1, 1972.
12. It is much easier for the Justice Department to prove that an indi-
vidual has failed to file a report in violation of the' provisions of the Act than
to establish that he has acquired or used funds illegally. S. REP. No. 91-1139,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1970).
13. See definition in note 5, supra.
14. See definition in note 6, supra.
15. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b(d)(1)-(2) (1970) and 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.33(a)-(c) (1972).
16. The bank, as drawee, must maintain copies of all checks except those
less than $100, or those on accounts which can expect to draw over 100 checks
per month, such as certain payroll, dividend, or employee benefit checks. 31
C.F.R. § 103.34(b)(3) (1973).
17. 31 C.F.R. § 103.36(c) (1972).
18. Id. All such records, those of banks and financial institutions, must be
filed or stored in such a way as to be accessible within a reasonable period of
time, taking into consideration the nature of the record, and the amount of
time expired since the record was made. Id.
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substantial domestic and foreign currency transactions di-
rectly to him. 19 Furthermore, the Secretary may require that
each person 20 making large foreign currency transactions re-
port them directly to him. 21 These reports must be made on
forms prescribed by the Secretary 22 and filed according to
specific guidelines issued by his office. 23 To insure enforce-
ment of the Act, the Secretary is given the authority to seek
certain civil and criminal penalties, 24 and to seek an injunc-
tion against any act or practice constituting a violation of the
provisions of the Act. 25
The Act and its implementing treasury regulations were
challenged immediately in Stark v. Connally.26 In Stark, a
bank, several of its individual depositors, the California Ban-
kers Association, and the American Civil Liberties Union
challenged the Act and its implementing regulations as an
unwarranted invasion of privacy in violation of the fourth
amendment, and sought a preliminary injunction against its
implementation. Concentrating on the broad authority given
19. 31 U.S.C. § 1081-83 (1970) and 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1972). The latter
provides: "(a) Each financial institution shall file a report of each deposit,
withdrawal, exchange of currency or other payment or transfer, by, through,
or to such financial institution, which involves a transaction in currency of
more than $10,000. (b) . . . [T]his section shall not (1) require reports of
transactions with Federal Reserve Banks or Federal Home Loan Banks; (2)
require reports of transactions solely with, or originated by, financial institu-
tions or foreign banks; or (3) require a bank to report transactions with an
established customer maintaining a deposit relationship with the bank, in
amounts which the bank may reasonably conclude do not exceed amounts
commensurate with the customary conduct of the business, industry and
profession of the customer concerned."
20. Person is defined as "an invididual, or corporation, a partnership, a
trust or estate, a joint stock company, an association, a syndicate, joint
venture, or other unincorporated organization or group, and all entities cog-
nizable as legal personalities." 31 C.F.R. § 103.11 (1972).
21. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1141-43 (1970) and 31 C.F.R. §§103.23-.24 (1972). Each
person who causes currency or any monetary instrument exceeding $5,000 to
be transported from the United States on any one occasion to any place
outside the United States, and each person who receives more than $5,000 in
currency or other monetary instruments on one occasion from outside the
United States must file a report with the Secretary. 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.23-.24
(1972).
22. 31 C.F.R. § 103.25(d) (1972).
23. 31 C.F.R. § 103.25 (1972).
24. 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.47 and 103.49 (1972).
25. 31 U.S.C. § 1057 (1970).
26. Stark v. Connally, 347 F. Supp. 1242 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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the Secretary to implement the Act rather than on the regu-
lations themselves, 27 the federal district court upheld the
recordkeeping and foreign reporting provisions, but struck
down the domestic reporting provisions as an unreasonable
invasion of the fourth amendment provision protecting "the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures."
2
In allowing the depositor plaintiffs the right to assert a
fourth amendment interest in the bank's records of their ac-
counts, the federal district court distinguished prior cases
2 9
which had consistently held that a bank's customers have no
standing to object to a subpoena or a summons of the bank's
records of their accounts. 30 The court concluded that a de-
positor has a "reasonable expectation '31 that the information
on his checks will not be made available to the government
without his being afforded the protection of existing legal
process. Therefore, the court decided that the depositors have
a recognizable fourth amendment interest in a bank's records
of their accounts, and that the depositor plaintiffs thus had
standing to object to the domestic reporting provisions of the
Act. 32
27. Id. at 1251: "We must look, not merely to what the government says it
intends to do, but to the much broader authorization of the Act itself."
28. Id. at 1251. The district court's conclusion that the domestic reporting
provision was unconstitutional was based primarily upon its finding that
"the Act ... makes no provision for any summons, either judicial or adminis-
trative, as the means whereby the Secretary can demand reports from banks
and their customers concerning the details of their financial transactions."
Id. at 1249.
29. E.g., Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1969); Galbraith v.
United States, 387 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1968); Application of Cole, 342 F.2d 5 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965); De Masters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79
(9th Cir. 1963), cert. dismissed, 375 U.S. 936 (1963).
30. The court noted that all the prior cases which had denied standing to
a customer to object to a subpoena or a summons of his records held by a
bank involved situations in which (1) the government agency was seeking
only the bank's records, and (2) the government agency was following estab-
lished procedures for obtaining such records and (3) the government agency
was seeking records claimed to be relevant and material to a specific matter
then under inquiry. However, the court found that none of these elements
were present in the operation of the domestic reporting provisions of the
Bank Secrecy Act. 347 F. Supp. at 1248.
31. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See note 54, infra.
32. For an excellent discussion of the federal district court's "hypotheti-
cal" approach to standing in Stark v. Connally, see Note, 51 TEX. L. REV. 602,
605-07 (1973).
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On appeal, the United States Supreme Court in Califor-
nia Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz33 upheld the recordkeeping and
foreign reporting provisions of the Act 34 and sustained the
validity of the domestic reporting provisions insofar as they
were alleged to infringe on the rights of the financial institu-
tions. 35 Significantly, however, the Court refused to entertain
the depositor plaintiffs' fourth amendment challenge to the
domestic reporting provisions, finding that the individual de-
positors did not engage in any type of $10,000 domestic cur-
rency transaction that the Act would require their banks to
report to the government, and thus, that the depositor plain-
tiffs lacked standing to challenge the domestic reporting pro-
visions. 3 6 The Court also declined to entertain the bank plain-
tiff's contentions that the recordkeeping provisions of the Act
undercut a depositor's right to challenge effectively a sum-
mons of his bank records, and that the bank itself should be
allowed to assert a violation of its depositor's rights.3 7
33. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). California
Bankers was decided together with Shultz v. California Bankers Ass'n (No.
72-1073) and Stark v. Connally, sub nom. Stark v. Shultz (No. 72-1196).
34. The Court, in upholding the recordkeeping provisions against the
fourth amendment challenge, concluded that the mere maintenance by the
bank of records which can be disclosed only by existing legal process does not
violate the fourth amendment rights of either the bank or the depositor
plaintiffs. Id. at 52. In affirming the constitutionality of the foreign reporting
provisions of the Act, the Court relied on the settled principle that Congress
has plenary authority to regulate foreign commerce and to delegate sig-
nificant portions of this power to the President. See, e.g., Chicago & Southern
Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103,109 (1948); United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936); Board of
Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 56 (1933). See also United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1975); United States v. United States District Court,
407 U.S. 297, 310 (1972).
35. The Supreme Court held that the domestic reporting provisions were
valid as to the bank plaintiffs because "the bank is itself a party to each of
these transactions, earns a portion of its income from conducting such trans-
actions, and in the past may have kept records of similar transactions on a
voluntary basis for its own purposes." 416 U.S. at 66.
36. Id. at 68-69. In reaching its conclusion that the individual depositors
did not have standing to challenge the domestic reporting provisions, the
Court was careful to state that: "In so holding, we do not, of course, mean to
imply that such claims would be meritorious if presented by a litigant who
has standing." Id. at 68, n.28.
37. Id. at 51. The court concluded that whether the depositor may be able
to assert his rights through the bank, or whether the bank may allege the
wrong done to the depositor in obtaining relief "need not now be decided,
since, in any event, the claim is premature." Id. For the proposition that an
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In a vigorous dissent, Justice Douglas criticized the ma-
jority's decision upholding the constitutionality of the rec-
ordkeeping provisions38 and attacked the validity of the re-
porting requirements, declaring them a violation of a person's
"expectation of privacy"-his expectation that his bank rec-
ords will be disclosed only pursuant to valid legal process. 39
Similarly, Justice Douglas denounced the Supreme Court's
avoidance of the issue respecting the constitutionality of the
reporting provisions of the Act, and declared that delivery of
bank records without a hearing on the issue of probable cause
violated the fourth amendment. 40
The claim of a depositor against compulsory process of
bank records acquired without a prior hearing to determine
probable cause was raised subsequently in United States v.
Miller.4 1 In Miller, the defendant first contended that the rec-
oicdkeeping provisions of the Act were unconstitutional as a
violation of his fourth amendment right to be free from un-
reasonable searches and seizures. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals disposed of the argument by stating that the con-
stitutionality of the recordkeeping provisions had already
been upheld in California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz. 42 Defen-
dant also contended that the introduction into evidence of
copies of his bank records, which were obtained from the bank
by means of an illegal grand jury subpoena duces tecum, 43
injured party may assert his rights through another, see United States v.
Scrap, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (an unincorporated association had standing to
assert the rights of members who breathe air and use forests, rivers,
streams, mountains and natural resources); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (appellant had standing to assert the rights of unmarried persons
denied access to contraceptives); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
(association had standing to assert violation of its members' right to freedom
of association); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (school may
assert the rights of parents and children). But see Tileston v. Ullman, 318
U.S. 44 (1943) (physician lacks standing to assert violation of constitutional
rights of patients); Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U.S. 304 (1898) (municipality
did not have standing to assert rights of citizens).
38. 416 U.S. at 86.
39. Id. at 89.
40. Id. at 90.
41. 500 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 1010 (1975).
42. Id. at 756. In California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, the Supreme Court
upheld the recordkeeping and foreign reporting provisions, but declined to
address the constitutionality of the domestic reporting provisions due to lack
of standing by the depositor plaintiffs. See cases cited at note 34, supra.
43. The purported grand jury subpoenas were issued by the United
1976] 839
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was a violation of his rights. The Fifth Circuit agreed and
reversed the conviction, concluding that obtaining copies of
defendant's bank checks by means of a faulty subpoena duces
tecum constituted an unlawful invasion of defendant's fourth
amendment interests in the privacy of his papers and records,
and that the defendant was entitled to a new trial "free from
the taint of evidence improperly acquired."'44
In reversing the defendant's conviction, the Fifth Circuit
concluded sub silentio that the defendant had standing to
challenge a faulty subpoena of his bank records since stand-
ing is an essential prerequisite to the hearing of any case or
controversy by a tribunal.4 5 In according the defendant the
requisite standing to complain of the claimed illegality of the
subpoena duces tecum, the court declined to apply earlier
cases which had denied standing to a depositor challenging
Internal Revenue Service subpoenas of records pertaining to
his banking transactions, 46 or subpoenas of his tax records in
the possession of a third party.47 The earlier cases held such
records to be the property of the bank, and denied recognition
States Attorney rather than by the court or by the grand jury, and on a date
when the grand jury was not in session. Id. at 758.
44. Id. at 758. The government's petition for rehearing and suggestion
for rehearing en bane were denied by a narrow 8-7 vote, with seven circuit
judges dissenting on the grounds that "the panel opinion departs radically
from prior decisions denying to bank customers the standing to challenge
subpoenas of bank records of their accounts." 508 F.2d 588, 589 (5th Cir. 1975).
However, on June 9, 1975, the Supreme Court granted the government's
petition for writ of certiorari. 421 U.S. 1010 (1975).
45. M. FORKOSCH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at 71-76 (2d ed. 1969). The gist
of the question of standing is whether the party seeking relief has "alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional ques-
tions." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). See generally Sedler, Standing
to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599
(1962); Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV.
423 (1974).
46. E.g., Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1969); Galbraith v.
United States, 387 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1968); O'Donnell v. Sullivan, 364 F.2d 43
(1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 969 (1966).
47. E.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); Donaldson v. United
States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971); Garrett v. United States, 511 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir.
1975). See also Flippen, The Internal Revenue Service Summons: An Unrea-
sonable Expense Burden on Banks and an Invasion of Depositors' Privacy?,
12 AM. BUS. L.J. 249, 253-59 (1974).
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of any depositor's rights to them, whether sought under an
ownership theory,48 or by virtue of an agency theory.4 9
The language used by the Fifth Circuit in Miller indicated
that the defendant was considered to have both an ownership
interest and a "reasonable expectation" of privacy interest in
the bank's records of his accounts.50 However, to assert an
ownership interest in the records of another, a person must
show either a proprietary or a possessory right in those rec-
ords.51 A depositor probably cannot assert a proprietary or
possessory right to those records since the bank owns, posses-
ses, controls, makes, pays for, and maintains the records of a
depositor's account.5 2 Numerous federal courts faced with the
same issue have concluded that a bank's records of its trans-
actions with a depositor are not the private papers of the
depositor, and that the depositor has no standing to challenge
the validity of a summons of these records. 53
48. Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1969); Application of
Cole, 342 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965); De Masters v.
Arend, 313 F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. dismissed, 375 U.S. 936 (1963); Foster
v. United States, 265 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959).
49. Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316, 318 (9th Cir. 1969); Schulze v.
Rayunec, 350 F.2d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, Boughner v. Schulze,
382 U.S. 919 (1965).
50. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' reliance on Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886), and reference to the records as those of the depositor, 500
F.2d at 757, and the statement that the bank depositor's rights are
threatened by an improper disclosure, not those of the bank, all establish
that the court accorded Miller an ownership interest and a cognizable pri-
vacy interest in the bank's records. 508 F.2d at 590 n.2.
51. E.g., Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 523 (1971); United
States v. Bank of Commerce, 405 F.2d 931, 934 (3d Cir. 1969); Galbraith v.
United States, 387 F.2d 617, 618 (10th Cir. 1968).
52. Brief for appellant at 21, United States v. Miller, No. 74-1179 (U.S.S.
Ct., cert. granted June 9, 1975). The bank's ownership, possession and control
of the records is similar to that of a corporation's control of its records in the
hands of a third party, which the United States Supreme Court has held "are
records in which the taxpayer (or depositor) has no proprietary interest of
any kind, which are owned by the third person, which are in his hands, and
which relate to the third person's business transactions with the taxpayer (or
depositor)." See, e.g., United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454, 458 n.4 (6th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Nat'l State Bank, 454 F.2d 1249, 1251 n.3 (7th Cir.
1972); S.E.C. v. First Security Bank of Utah, 447 F.2d 166, 168 (10th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, Nemelka v. S.E.C., 404 U.S. 1038 (1972). But see Zimmerman v.
Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936).
53. Although these cases have considered the issue in the context of an
I.R.S. summons rather than a grand jury subpoena, they are proper author-
1976]
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It also seems unlikely that a depositor can successfully
assert a "reasonable expectation" that the information con-
tained in the bank records will remain private.54 If the fourth
amendment does not protect information given to a colleague
who turns out to be a government agent, 55 then surely it
cannot protect information voluntarily given to a bank that
furnishes the information to the government only by sub-
poena or summons. The data contained on bank checks is not
within the category of information that one justifiably in-
tends to keep private;5 6 furthermore, the fourth amendment
does not protect what a person knowingly exposes to the
public. 57 The fourth amendment cannot, therefore, be re-
garded as conclusively protecting information contained on a
bank check which the depositor voluntarily injects into the
stream of commerce.
Although past jurisprudence consistently has denied
standing to a depositor to challenge a subpoena or summons
of records of his accounts, these cases have dealt only in the
context of a legal subpoena or summons.58 However, in Miller
the grand jury subpoena was found to be illegal, having been
issued by the United States Attorney and on a date when the
grand jury was not in session. As the prior cases had held, a
bank depositor may not have a "reasonable expectation" that
the information contained on his checks will remain private,
ity for the denial of a depositor's proprietory or possessory right in records of
his accounts in the possession of a third party. See, e.g., United States v.
Continental Bank & Trust Co., 503 F.2d 45, 49 (10th Cir. 1974); Fifth Avenue
Peace Parade Committee v. Gray, 480 F.2d 326, 332 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 948 (1974).
54. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 25, United States v. Miller, No.
74-1179 (U.S.S. Ct., cert. granted June 9, 1975). See, e.g., Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz established the "reasonable expectation of privacy"
approach.
55. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971); Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206,
211 (1966).
56. Names of payees or drawers, dates, and other memoranda appearing
on such negotiable instruments are not intended to be confidential. Indeed,
the commercial function of negotiable instruments requires that such infor-
mation be conveyed. Furthermore, the drawer is aware that the instrument
will be viewed by various employees at the bank where it is cashed or
deposited. Brief for appellant at 29, United States v. Miller, No. 74-1179
(U.S.S. Ct., cert. granted June 9, 1975).
57. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). See note 54, supra.
58. See notes 47 & 48, supra.
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but a depositor does reasonably expect that the information
will be divulged by the bank only pursuant to legal process.
Failure to accord standing to a depositor to challenge an
illegal subpoena or summons issued to his bank would subject
the depositor to the possibility of conviction on illegally ob-
tained evidence. Likewise, allowing the bank alone the right
to object to an illegal subpoena or summons that would sub-
ject the depositor to the possibility of conviction on illegally
obtained evidence does not furnish sufficient protection for
the depositor.5 9
Certiorari was granted in Miller, and its disposition by
the United States Supreme Court will have a substantial
effect on the doctrine of standing and on the right of a de-
positor to challenge a subpoena or summons of his bank rec-
ords. An affirmation of Miller by the Supreme Court on the
ground that the defendant's fourth amendment interests in
the privacy of his papers and records were violated would
change the current state of the law. On the other hand, a
reversal of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Miller would deny
the defendant the right to challenge illegally obtained evi-
dence used against him at trial. In light of past jurispru-
dence, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Supreme
Court will affirm the decision and hold that a depositor has
limited standing to challenge an illegal grand jury subpoena
of records of the depositor's bank account. However, in reach-
ing its decision, the Supreme Court should thoroughly re-
assess the right of the people to be secure in their papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the
government's right of access to information that is useful in
criminal investigations. Although this information is helpful
to government agencies in investigating criminal activity, it
is questionable whether the beneficial effects of access to the
information counterbalances the danger of intrusion into the
personal affairs of millions of American citizens.
Robert W. Nuzum
59. Since the prior jurisprudence has concluded that the records of the
depositor's bank accounts are not the property of the depositor but remain
the property of the bank, the court could allow the bank to assert the viola-
tion of its depositor's constitutional rights. However, it is doubtful that the
bank would take the required interest and effectively argue the depositor's
case.
1976]
